Missouri Law Review
Volume 61
Issue 2 Spring 1996

Article 5

Spring 1996

Constitutional Considerations Underlie Missouri's Expansion of
Fetal Rights within Its Wrongful Death Statute
Elizabeth S. Brown

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Elizabeth S. Brown, Constitutional Considerations Underlie Missouri's Expansion of Fetal Rights within Its
Wrongful Death Statute, 61 MO. L. REV. (1996)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Brown: Brown: Constitutional Considerations Underlie Missouri's Expansion

Constitutional Considerations Underlie
Missouri's Expansion of Fetal Rights
Within its Wrongful Death Statute
Connor v. Monkem 1
I. INTRODUCTION

When Missouri courts determine the existence of a cause of action under
the wrongful death statute they have considered it necessary to address
whether a fetus is a "person" within the statute. In Connor v. Monkem,
Missouri extended its recognition of the rights of a fetus within its wrongful
death statute beyond its previous decisions and those noted in other
jurisdictions. 2 Missouri's decision differs distinctively from the law's
traditional view of the fetus as a part of the woman, therefore devoid of rights
as a separate entity.
Additionally, the decision may implicate constitutional concerns. In
adopting its definition of a "person," the court relied on section 1.205' to
decide that "viability is the determinative point at which the legally protectable
rights, privileges, and immunities of an unborn child should be deemed to
arise."4 In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,5 petitioners challenged
the constitutionality of this statute. The U.S. Supreme Court stated that this
portion of the Missouri statute would only be ripe for review if the state relied
on the statute for more than simply an opinion about its concern for life. In
holding that viability is the determinative point where fetal rights begin, the
Connor decision expresses more than merely an opinion about Missouri's
concern for life.
II. FACTS & HOLDING
Vicki Richards, a passenger in an automobile driven by Kathy Lindsey,
died after a tractor trailer driven by Warren Richter, an employee of Monkem
Company, Inc., struck the Lindsey vehicle.' Ms. Richards was approximately

1. 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995) (en bane).
2. Id at 93.
3. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205 (1994).
4. Connor, 898 S.W.2d at 92.

5. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
6. Connor, 898 S.W.2d at 90.
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four months pregnant at the time of the accident.7 The four-month-old
nonviable fetus did not survive
Jason Connor was the unmarried father of the unborn child.9 Connor
brought a wrongful death action against Lindsey, Richter, and Monkem
Company for the death of the unborn fetus.'0 The trial court dismissed the
suit for failure to state a claim, finding no cognizable cause of action for the
wrongful death of a nonviable fetus."
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District reversed the trial
court's dismissal, concluding that Missouri recognizes a cause of action for the
wrongful death of a nonviable fetus. 2 The Missouri Supreme Court granted
transfer to cure an inconsistency with the decision of the Western District
3
Court of Appeals.

In its opinion, the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the fundamental
issue of whether a nonviable unborn child qualifies as a"person" capable of
supporting a claim for wrongful death under Missouri's wrongful death
statute. 4 The court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.

12. Id. The unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals is Connor v. Monkem
Co., No. 64884, 1994 WL 493561 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1994).
13. Id. This decision of the Eastern District Court of Appeals was also
inconsistent with the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Rambo v. Lawson, 799
S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1990).
In May, D.D.S. v. Greater Kansas City Dental Soc'y, 863 S.W.2d 941 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993), the Court of Appeals for the Western District upheld the trial court's
dismissal of an action for the wrongful death of a three-month-old fetus Id.
at 948.
The mother, who was three months pregnant, allegedly miscarried after she read a
purportedly libelous newsletter written by defendant. Id.
The Western District Court
of Appeals relied upon the Missouri Supreme Court's holding in Rambo when it stated,
"In Rambo, a plurality [of the Missouri Supreme Court] ruled that the term person
does not include a nonviable fetus, and therefore, a civil cause of action for the
wrongful death of a nonviable fetus will not lie.... The Rambo decision controls and
decides this point against plaintiff. . . ' Id.at 949.
14. Connor, 898 S.W.2d at 90. Missouri's wrongful death statute provides:
Whenever the death of a person results from any act, conduct, occurrence,
transaction, or circumstance which, if death had not ensued, would have
entitled such person to recover damages in respect thereof, the person or
party who, or the corporation which, would have been liable if death had
not ensued shall be liable in an action for damages, notwithstanding the
death of the person injured ....

Mo. Rv. STAT. §537.080 (1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/5
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The court held that section 1.20516
the case for further proceedings.'
defines a "person" for purposes of Missouri's wrongful death statute, thus
permitting a parent to recover for the wrongful death of a four-month-old
nonviable fetus. 7
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Development of Fetal Rights in Tort
The common law refused to recognize a duty to an unborn plaintiff.
Consequently, children who were born with injuries they sustained during
prenatal development could not recover. 8 This doctrine emerged from the
historical treatment of the fetus as part of the mother and possessing no rights
as a separate entity. 9
In 1946, the court in Bonbrest v. Kotz0 reversed the existing law and
recognized a cause of action for prenatal injuries to a fetus. The Bonbrest
court noted, however, that the infant, in addition to being born alive, sustained
the injuries when viable.2' Therefore, the infant had standing to sue as a
separate entity from the mother.22 The impact of this decision led every
jurisdiction to follow the Restatement (Second) of Torts and permit claims by
later born children for their prenatal injuries.' The Missouri Supreme Court
first recognized such an action for injury to a viable child who was later born
alive in Steggall v. Morris.24

15. Connor, 898 S.W.2d at 93.
16. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1996).

17. Connor, 898 S.W.2d at 92.
18. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884) (denying
recovery to administrator suing on behalf of prematurely born child for injuries
sustained while child was nonviable fetus).
19. In denying recovery in Dietrich,Justice Holmes held that a fetus is part of its
mother and is not a separate being of its own right. Any injury to the fetus, therefore,
is actually an injury to the mother for her to recover damages on her own behalf. Id.
at 14.
20. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
21. Id. at 139.
22. Id.
23. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROssER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55,

at 367-68 (5th ed. 1984). See Gary A. Meadows, Wrongful Death andthe Lost Society
of the Unborn, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 99, (1992). See also Joseph McReynolds, Note,
Childhood's End: Wrongful Death of a Fetus, 42 LA. L. REv. 1411 (1982); Chase,
Annotation, Liabilityfor PrenatalInjuries, 40 A.L.R. 3d 1222 (1971) (discussion of
state cases in which action for prenatal injuries was recognized).
24. 258 S.W. 2d 577 (Mo. 1953) (en banc).
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The law soon expanded fetal rights in tort by recognizing a wrongful
death cause of action when injuries to a viable fetus resulted in a stillborn
fetus as distinguished from a born-alive fetus.25 A Minnesota court first
26
addressed this issue in Verkennes v. Corniea.
The Minnesota court
concluded that it would permit an action for wrongful death under the state's
wrongful death statute when a tortfeasor destroyed a life capable of
independent existence.27 Thirty-seven jurisdictions have since abolished the
"born-alive" rule and expanded their wrongful death statutes to encompass a
claim for a fetus that dies before birth.28 The Missouri Supreme Court first
held that Missouri's wrongful death statute provided a cause of action for a
fetus who was injured when viable and who was later stillborn in O'Grady v.
29

Brown.

As in O'Grady, almost all of the jurisdictions that currently allow
recovery for the wrongful death of an unborn fetus impose the limit that the
injured fetus be viable.3" However, four states-Georgia, Rhode Island,
Louisiana and, now, Missouri-have emphasized that a fetus is a "person"
from conception, thus indicating that a cause of action for wrongful death of
a stillborn, nonviable fetus might exist.3' The position taken by states reflect
the belief that the right extends from the fetus rather than the woman.32
Although these states have expressed their view that a nonviable fetus is
a "person," they have not all, in fact, abolished both the born-alive and
viability requirements for wrongful death actions. For example, in Hornbuckle
v. PlantationPipe Line Co.,"3 the Georgia Supreme Court considered a child
"in being, from the time of its conception, where it will be for the benefit of
such child to be so considered."3 4 The Georgia court held that a child had

25. Id. at 582.

26. 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949); Meadows, supra note 23 at 102-03.
27. Id. at 839. The Minnesota wrongful death statute stated, "when death is
caused by the wrongful act or omission of any person or corporation, the personal
representative of the decedent may maintain an action therefore if he might have
maintained an action had he lived.... ." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (West 1947).
28. See KEETON, supra note 23, at 370 & n.32 (listing states); Meadows, supra
note 23 at n.29; Murphy S. Klasing, The Death of an Unborn Child; Jurisdictional
InconsistenciesIn Wrongful Death, CriminalHomicide,and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP.
L. REV. 933, 933-34 (1995).
29. 654 S.W.2d 904, 911 (Mo. 1976) (en bane).
30. See supra note 22.
31. Meadows, supra note 23, at n.71; Klasing, supra note 28 at 949-951.
32. Id at 949.
33. 93 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 1956).
34. Id. at 728 (citing Morrow v. Scott, 7 Ga. 535, 537 (1849)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/5
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a cause of action for a tortious injury sustained at any point after
conception.35 Although the court indicated that the right of action for
prenatal injuries becomes available at conception, the child in this case was
later born alive.36 Therefore, the case did not present the court with the
born-alive requirement. Subsequently, the Georgia Court of Appeals appeared
to question its rejection of the viability requirement in Billingsley v. State3".
Rhode Island is another state which recognizes a fetus as a "person" at
conception.3" In Presley v. Newport Hosp.,39 the Rhode Island court stated
its adherence to the rule that "one who survives birth may recover damages
from a wrongdoer who inflicts prenatal injury regardless of the state of fetal
development at which the injury occurs if the injured party can come forth
with reliable proof of a causal link between the tortious act and the injury."4
Although the Rhode Island court appeared to reject the viability distinction,
it counterbalanced this expansion of the law with the requirement, as in
Hornbuckle,4' that the nonviable, injured fetus survive birth in order to
recover for the injuries it sustained prior to viability.42 Furthermore, because
the complaint in Presley alleged that wrongful acts occurred when the fetus
was viable, the facts of Presley did not require that the court decide upon the
viability issue.43 Miccolis v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co.' provided
further proof that Rhode Island had not truly abandoned the viability
requirement for wrongful death actions.45 In Miccolis, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that a five week old fetus was not a "person" within the
meaning of the state's wrongful death statute.46 The court rejected its prior
reasoning when it stated that recognizing a fetus as a "person" at conception

35. Id.Similarly, in Porter v. Lassiter, the court found that for purposes of
determining the existence of a cause of action for the death of a child a "fetus becomes
a child when it is 'quick' or capable of moving in the mother's womb." 87 S.E.2d
100, 102 (1955).
36. Id.
37. 360 S.E.2d 451, 452 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that a fetus is not a
"person" under the vehicular homicide statute).
38. Klasing, supranote 28, at 950.
39. 365 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976).
40. Id.
at 752.
41. 93 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 1956).
42. Presley, 365 A.2d at 752.
43. Id
44. 587 A.2d 67, 71 (R.I. 1991).
45. Klasing, supranote 28, at 950.
46. Klasing, supra note 28, at 950.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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would "give rise to actions based upon speculation
and conditions wherein
47
predictability would be virtually nonexistent.1
Prior to the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Connor, Louisiana
appeared to be the only state truly rejecting both the viability and born-alive
requirements in the context of the state's wrongful death statute.48 In Danos
49 the Supreme Court of Louisiana allowed a cause of action for
v. St. Pierre,
the wrongful death of a six-month old fetus. 0 The court gave three principal
reasons for the decision." First, the court stated, "it would be illogical and
arbitrary for the cause of action to depend on whether the child lives outside
the womb for a few minutes. 5 2 Next, the court pointed out that a decision
not to recognize a cause of action when the child is bom dead benefits the
tortfeasor who causes prenatal death rather than serious injury. 3 Finally, the
court relied on newly enacted legislation in Louisiana which announced the
policy that a human being exists "from the moment of fertilization and
implantation."54
B. Missouri'sPre-Connorapproach to fetal rights
in the context of wrongful death
The Missouri Supreme Court first abandoned the born-alive
5
requirement for wrongful death actions in O'Grady."
The court noted the
purpose of the wrongful death statute as providing "compensation for the loss
of the companionship, comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel, .

.

. and

6
support' of one who would have been alive but for the defendants' wrong.0
In interpreting Missouri's wrongful death statute, the O'Grady court
highlighted the three basic objectives behind the statute: "to provide
compensation to bereaved plaintiffs for their loss, to ensure that tortfeasors
pay for the consequences of their actions, and generally to deter harmful
conduct which might lead to death."5' The Missouri Supreme Court found

47. Klasing, supra note 28, at 950. This line of reasoning conflicts with prior

Rhode Island cases which suggest that the courts should not consider the difficulty of
proof in deciding whether a cause of action exists. Klasing, supra note 28, at 950.
48. Klasing, supra note 28, at 950.
49. 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981).

50. Id.
at 637.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.at 638.
Id.
Id.
Id.
654 S.W.2d 904, 911 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
56. Id at 908 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.090 (1978)).
57. Id.at 909.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/5
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that it could equally achieve these purposes by allowing causes of action in
situations where the deceased fetus was born or unborn.58
O'Grady overruled the court's previous ruling in Hardin v. Sanders59
which held that an unborn fetus was not a "person" entitled to maintain an
action under the provisions of the wrongful death statute.6" In support of its
decision in Hardin, the Missouri Supreme court noted that Roe v. Wade6
stated that a fetus is not a "person" within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2
In 1990, the Missouri Supreme Court in Rambo v. Lawson63 continued
to uphold the viability requirement for wrongful death actions when it
reversed a Missouri Court of Appeals decision which held that "a wrongful
death action [would] lie for the tortious killing of a nonviable fetus."' The
case involved the tortious death of a three-month-old, nonviable fetus. 5 The
Court of Appeals for the Western District noted that "in light of current
medical knowledge we see no principled reason to regard viability as the
determinant in wrongful death actions for the death of an unborn child."66
The Western District Court of Appeals also injected the notion that it would
deny the existence of a cause of action due to the difficulty in establishing
causation in cases involving injury to a nonviable fetus.67
In overruling this decision, the Missouri Supreme Court held that "a
nonviable fetus is not a person within the meaning of the wrongful death
statute."6 The court stated, "we do not believe it is necessary to extend the
definition of person beyond the O'Grady standard in order to serve the
purposes of the wrongful death statute, or to compensate the plaintiffs
adequately for their loss." 69 The court did note, however, that Missouri
statute section 1.205.270 points to the rejection of the viability standard when
it states that "the laws of this state shall be interpreted and construed to
acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development, all

58. Id.

59.
60.
61.
62.

538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
O'Grady,654 S.W.2d at 911.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 158.

63. 799 S.W.2d 62 (1990).

64. Rambo v. Lawson, No. WD 41747, 1990 WL 54277, *7 (Mo. Ct. App., May
1, 1990), overruled by 799 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1990).
65. Id.
66. Id. at *3.
at *5.
67. Id.
68. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Mo. 1990).

69. Id.
70. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1986).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and
residents of this state . . .. "." The court, however, avoided deciding the
effect of this statute when it found that the statute did not become operative
until after the accident in Rambo and "so could not affect the substantive law
governing the plaintiffs' claim."7 2 The court also noted that the legislature
directed section 1.205.2 at abortion and did not intend for the bill to expand
causes of action for wrongful death.73
The dissent in Rambo cited several reasons for abandoning the viability
standard when considering whether a wrongful death cause of action exists. 4
First, the dissent stated that medical authority has long recognized that an
unborn child is in existence from the moment of conception.75 Additionally,
the dissent noted that advances in medical technology have increased the
reliability of proving causation in these cases." Next, the dissent argued that
the viability standard is arbitrary because "the sole difference between viability
and nonviability is merely a matter of time. 7 7 Finally, the dissent pointed
out that the law has recognized a nonviable fetus in other areas of the law
such as under the Civil Rights Act, within the meaning of insurance policies,
and for purposes of inheritance.78
House Bill No. 1596 (Act) known as "An Act ... relating to unborn
children and abortion ... [and] to the use of public funds," 9 contained the
statute, section 1.205, referred to by the Connor court for its definition of
"person" for purposes of the wrongful death statute.8" In Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services,8 petitioners challenged this section of the Act
renamed by the Court as the "preamble."82 The Missouri Supreme Court
found that the preamble was a permissible exercise of the state's authority to

71. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 63.
72. Id at 64.
73. Id.
74. Id, at 66-68.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 68.
77. Id, at 69 (citing State ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Mo.
1976) (en banc)). Conversely, the majority in Hardin noted that conception is a
"definite, observable event." Hardin, 538 S.W.2d at 339.

78. Rambo, 799 S.W.2d at 70.
79. H.R. 1596, 83rd Gen. Ass., 2nd Sess. (1986).
80. Randall D. Eggert, Andrew J. Klinghammer & Jeanne Morrison, Special
Project 'Of Winks and Nods '-Webster's Uncertain Effect on Current and Future
Abortion Legislation, 55 MO. L. RFv. 163, 165-66 (1990).
81. 492 U.S. 490 (1989) [hereinafter Webster].
82. Id. at 490.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/5
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make value judgments favoring childbirth over abortion. 3 By viewing the
preamble as an expression of the "value judgment" of the state, the plurality
avoided a decision on the constitutionality of the preamble.84 The plurality
concluded that it could avoid a determination on this issue until the Missouri
courts decided "the extent to which the preamble's language might be used to
interpret other state statutes or regulations."85 In finding it unnecessary to
decide the preamble's constitutionality, the plurality noted that "it will be time
enough for federal courts to address the meaning of the preamble should it be
applied to restrict the activities of appellees in some concrete way."86
In his dissent in Webster, Justice Stevens rejected the State's argument
that the preamble merely amended its tort, property, and criminal laws.87 He
supported his conclusion by noting that Missouri did not base these areas of
law upon a definition of when life begins.88 Additionally, he recognized that
this argument could not withstand the prohibition, under the Missouri
Constitution, against statutes pertaining to more that one subject matter. 89
The Rambo decision left a potential plaintiff with a substantive opening
which would call on the Missouri Supreme Court to determine the effect of
83. Id. at 506. The right of a state to express such a "value judgment" was
enunciated in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), which found that "Roe did not
declare an unqualified 'constitutional right to abortion....' It implies no limitation on
the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion,
and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds." Id. at 473-74.
84. Eggert, supranote 85, at 170.
85. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506. Missouri has attempted to apply the preamble to
Missouri law in several instances. The first example involved adding nine months to
age in order to calculate a person's age from the time of conception. Eggert,
Klinghammer & Morrison, supra note 85, at n.47, (citing Columbia Daily Tribune,
July 25, 1989, at 10, col. 2). According to the Director of the Missouri Department
of Revenue, age must be calculated in time since birth rather than from conception.
Id. Therefore, one does not become eligible for a driver's license at fifteen years and
three months. Id Next, a woman in prison relied on the preamble to sue the state on
behalf of her fetus. Id. (citing Columbia Daily Tribune, Aug. 3, 1989, at 1, col. 1).
The woman maintained that her fetus was wrongly imprisoned in violation of its
constitutional rights. Id. When 21 people were acquitted of trespassing during a sit-in
at an abortion clinic they cited the preamble to support their necessity defense. Id.
(citing Columbia Daily Tribune, Aug. 17, 1989, at 1, col.2).
86. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506.
87. Id. at 570.
88. Id. at 570-71.
89. Id. at 570. Article 3, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution states:
No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed
in its title, except bills enacted under the third exception in section 37 of
this article and general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various
subjects and accounts for which moneys are appropriated.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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section 1.205 in deciding whether a cause of action for the wrongful death of
a nonviable fetus exists.' With the Connor decision, Missouri became the
fourth state to embrace the definition of a "person" as including a nonviable
fetus. Additionally, Missouri and Louisiana may now be the only two states
which 1allow a cause of action for the wrongful death of a stillborn, nonviable
fetus.

9

IV. INSTANT DECISION

A. The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Judge Price noted that the court faced the issue
whether the legislature, in enacting section 1.205.2, expressed an intention to
deem a nonviable, unborn child a "person" for purposes of a section
537.080' wrongful death claim. 3 The majority found that although section
1.205.2 did not expressly amend section 537.080, it "set out a canon of
interpretation" that conception, not viability, is the point when "the legally
94
protectable rights, privileges, and immunities of an unborn child arise.

90. See Klasing, supra note 28, at 945-46.
91. See supranote 41 (citing Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633 (1981) allowing
wrongful death action for nonviable, stillborn fetus).
92. The Missouri wrongful death statute provides:
Whenever the death of a person results from any act, conduct, occurrence,
transaction, or circumstance which, if death had not ensued, would have
entitled such person to recover damages in respect thereof, the person or
party who, or the corporation which, would have been liable if death had
not ensued shall believe in an action for damages, notwithstanding the death
of the person injured ....
Mo REV. STAT. § 537.080 (1994).
93. Connor, 898 S.W.2d at 92.
94. Connor, 898 S.W.2d at 92. Section 1.205 reads:
1. The general assembly of this state finds that: (1) The life of each
human beings at conception; (2) unborn children have protectable interests
in life, health, and well-being; (3) The natural parents of unborn children
have protectable interests in the life, health, and well-being of their unborn
child. 2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be
interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at
every stage of development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities
available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state, subject only
to the Constitution of the United States, and decisional interpretations
thereof by the United States Supreme Court and specific provisions to the
contrary in the statutes and constitution of this state. 3. As used in this
section, the term "unborn children" or "unborn child" shall include all
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss2/5
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The court reached beyond the wrongful death context, however, when it stated
that Missouri courts should read all Missouri statutes in coordination with this
statute's statement about legally protectable fetal rights developing at
conception."
Additionally, Judge Price cited section 1.205.1(3) as
"especially persuasive" in the court's decision because it provides that "the
natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests in the life, health,
and well-being of their unborn child. 9 6 The court determined, therefore, that
the legislature enacted section 1.205.2 as a rule of construction not limiting the
statute to a mere policy statement within the confines of the abortion
statute.97 Judge Price concluded that Missouri courts should interpret
"person" within the wrongful death statute to support parents' claims for the
wrongful death of a fetus even prior to viability.9"
Next, the court noted its departure from the majority of other jurisdictions
in deciding to uphold the wrongful death claim for a nonviable, unborn
fetus." In explaining its arguably unprecedented decision, the court pointed
out that the courts in most other jurisdictions cannot rely on guidance from
their wrongful death statutes."° This is the only reason the court provided
to explain its extreme minority decision disregarding viability as the standard
for recognizing a wrongful death action for an unborn fetus.''
Finally, the court focused on the issue of damages.0 2 The majority
recognized that although the death of a nonviable, unborn child may support

unborn child or children or the offspring of human beings from the moment
of conception until birth at every stage of biological development. 4.
Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action
against a women for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to
properly care for herself or by failing to follow any particular program of
prenatal care.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1994).
95. Connor, 898 S.W.2d at 92. The court cited its decision in State v. Knapp,
843 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. 1992) to support this determination. Knapp dealt with the
application of § 1.205 to the criminal involuntary manslaughter statute. The Knapp
court held that the definition of "person" in § 1.205 applied to the manslaughter statute.
Id. at 347-48. The Knapp court noted, however, that § 1.205 and the manslaughter
statute were both "passed in the same legislative session, on the same day, and as part
of the same act, H.B. 1596." Id.at 347.
96. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205.1(3) (1994).
97. Connor, 898 S.W.2d at 92.

98. Id
99. Id.
at 93.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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a wrongful death claim, it may be impossible to prove damages in such
cases. 3 Judge Price noted that a similarly difficult task in establishing
damages exists in wrongful conception cases but this difficulty does not
prevent wrongful conception claims."° The court pointed out the similar
difficulty in proving damages in wrongful death cases involving young
children or an unborn, viable fetus.' The court added, however, that these
difficulties "are all the more glaring [in cases] involving a child that has not
even reached the point of viability within the womb."'" Nonetheless, the
court found the difficulties in proving damages should not bar a plaintiffs
ability to state a claim and attempt such proof 0 7 Having concluded that
Missouri would allow a wrongful death action for the death of a nonviable,
unborn fetus," 8 and that the difficulty of proving damages in such cases
would not bar the plaintiffs ability to bring the action,0 9 the court reversed
and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings." 0
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Covington disagreed with the majority's reliance on section
1.205.2 for its conclusion that a nonviable fetus is a "person" within the
meaning of section 537.080."' In her dissent, Justice Covington maintained
that "section 1.205 has no effect on the outcome of this case." ' Justice
Covington based this decision on the conclusion that section 537.080 creates
a cause of action for the survivors of the deceased and does not affect the
rights of the unborn." 3 Justice Covington pointed out that the wrongful
death statute creates rights for the beneficiaries which have no derivative in
the rights of the deceased." 4 Therefore, the trial court in the Connor
decision did not deny the fetus any rights when it held that a non-viable fetus

103. Id.
104. Id. Wrongful conception claims attempt to hold a physician liable in tort for
damage to parents because of the physician's negligent sterilization. The damages
difficulty involves calculating the damage to the parents due to their having an
unwanted child.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987)).
107. Connor, 898 S.W.2d at 93.
108. Id. at 92.
109. Id. at 93.
110. Id.
111. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080 (1994).
112. Connor, 898 S.W.2d at 94.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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was not a person for the purposes of section 537.080.' 5 Justice Covington
concluded that section 1.205 is inapplicable because Missouri's wrongful death
statute is a right of the survivors of the deceased and, therefore, fails to
implicate the interpretation of section 1.205 which refers to the "rights,
privileges, or immunities of a fetus."'1 6 The dissent noted that it would defy
logic to conclude that "a statute concerning the rights of unborn children was
intended to create a cause of action in favor of the parents.""' The dissent
also rejected the majority's reliance on section 1.205.1(3) which implicates
parents protectable interests in the "life, health, and well-being of their unborn
child" as support for its holding."' The dissent recognized that section
1.205.1(3), unlike section 1.205.2, does not call for the interpretation of other
statutes in conjunction with it." 9 Justice Covington concluded by stating
2
that she would overrule the holding in Knapp1
1 in so far as it indicated that
§ 1.205 defined the term "persons" in conjunction with the involuntary
manslaughter statute.''
V. COMMENT
Chief Justice Covington's dissent in Connor highlights Justice Stevens'
dissent in Webster.'22 Justice Covington emphasized that Missouri's
wrongful death statute creates a cause of action for the survivors of a deceased
person."
She recognized that the
right created by the statute does not
2
derive from the rights of the fetus. 1
The concept of identifying the survivors as the locus of the right rather
than the fetus avoids creating fetal rights that treat the fetus as an entity
independent from the woman, thus preventing the possibility that these fetal
rights could be used against the pregnant women. With the creation of fetal
rights that emphasize the independence of the fetus, a woman could be held
liable for maternal negligence resulting in accidents that cause fetal injuries.
For example, a woman might be held liable for behavior during pregnancy

115. Id.

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(3) (1986)).
119. Id. See supra note 71.
120. 843 S.W.2d 345. See supranote 98. The Knapp court held that the § 1.205

defines the term person for purposes of Missouri's manslaughter statute.
121. Id. at 94-95.
122. Webster, 492 U.S. at 560-571.
123. Connor, 898 S.W.2d at 94.

124. Id., 898 S.W.2d at 94.
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having potentially adverse effects on the fetus such as poor nutrition, smoking,
or even exposing herself to work-place hazards.'25
Lawmakers need not view their options as either labelling the fetus a
person or denying its existence. By identifying the survivors as the focus of
the statutorily created wrongful death action rather than the fetus, lawmakers
could achieve the purposes of the statute while avoiding a threat to women's
autonomy. 2 6 The effect of a wrongful death action emanating from the
survivors would continue to compensate parents for the loss of their expected
child and protect the interest of a woman who has chosen to carry her
pregnancy to term.'
Additionally, recognition of the survivor's right
would also continue to protect and preserve life by deterring harmful conduct
2
and ensuring that tortfeasors pay for the consequences of their actions.' 1
Finally, recognizing the action as the survivor's would also make it
unnecessary for Missouri to give a meaning to "person" within the wrongful
death context which could conflict with the meaning of "person" as announced
in Roe v. Wade 29 for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although a word may mean different things in different contexts, the
problem here is that the definition of "person" for purposes of the wrongful
death statute comes directly out of the abortion statute. This indicates that the
courts will apply the same definition of fetal rights and personhood within the
abortion context contrary to the holding in Roe. The Webster court seemed
to warn against this outcome when it refused to decide the constitutionality of
the "preamble" until Missouri courts decided "the extent to which the
preamble's language might be used to interpret other state statutes or
regulations."' 30 In the nonabortion contexts, the Supreme Court has not
considered the possible adverse effects that granting fetal rights will have on
women's exercise of their constitutional rights.'' However, the expansion

125. Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with
Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE

L.J. 599, 606 (1986).
126. In O'Grady v. Brown, the Missouri Supreme court identified three basic
objectives behind the wrongful death statute: "to provide compensation to bereaved
plaintiffs for their loss, to ensure that tortfeasors pay for consequences of their actions,
and generally to deter harmful conduct which might lead to death.., these reasons
apply with equal force whether the deceased is born or unborn." 654 S.W.2d at 909
(citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 410 U.S. at 158. The holding in Roe was that "the word 'person,' as used
in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn." Id.
130. 492 U.S. at 506.
131. Johnsen, supra note 125 at 614.
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of fetal rights advocated in Connor may implicate constitutional liberty and
privacy interests that the Court has recognized in Roe and other cases.
Courts could avoid implicating such constitutional considerations when
allowing a tort claim for negligent destruction of a fetus by structuring and
interpreting laws to focus on compensating parents for the loss of their
expected child. This alternative would avoid equating the previable fetus with
a person while appropriately serving the goals of the wrongful death action.
VI. CONCLUSION

In its decision in Connor,the Missouri Supreme Court decided to expand
fetal rights to allow a wrongful death cause of action for a nonviable, unborn
fetus. Only one other jurisdiction has in fact rejected both the viability and
born-alive requirements for fetal wrongful death actions.
The Connor decision drags Missouri into unexplored and possibly
unconstitutional territory by using Missouri's abortion statute for the definition
of person within its wrongful death statute. The case presents the possibility
for an unprecedented intrusion on women's rights because it implicates and
threatens to destroy constitutional liberty and privacy interests previously
recognized by the United States Supreme Court.
ELIZABETH S. BROWN
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